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Abstract:
The RSA scheme is used to sign messages; however, in order to avoid forgeries,
a message can be padded with a xed string of data P . De Jonge and Chaum
showed in 1985 that forgeries can be constructed if the size of P (measured in
bytes) is less than the size of N=3, where N is the RSA modulus. Girault and
Misarsky then showed in 1997 that forgeries can be constructed if the size of
P is less than the size of N=2. In 2001, Brier, Clavier, Coron and Naccache
showed that forgeries can still be constructed when the size of P is less than two
thirds the size of N . In this paper, we demonstrate that this padding scheme is
always insecure; however, the complexity of actually nding a forgery is O(N).
We then focus specically on the next unsettled case, where P is less than 3=4
the size of N and show that nding a forgery is equivalent to solving a set of
diophantine equations. While we are not able to solve these equations, this work
may lead to a break-through by means of algebraic number theory techniques.
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1 RSA Fixed Padding Signature Schemes
RSA was invented in 1977 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [7]. It is still the
most widely implemented public key scheme, and is used to provide privacy
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and authentication for digital data. Signing messages is an RSA application
embedded in several standards, such as PKCS#1, v2.0 and v2.1 [8].
To sign a message m in an RSA scheme, the signer exponentiates with her
private key d to get md and computes this modulo N , the RSA xed mod-
ulus. To retrieve m, a receiver applies the signer's public key e to obtain
(md)e  m(mod N). The fact that applying e releases m to the receiver veries
that the owner of the key pair (d; e) was in fact the sender, as no-one else knows
d.
There are many ways to attack such a signature scheme. For example, sup-
pose Oscar is able to convince Alice to send him two dierent messages, m1 and
m2, signed with Alice's private key d. Then Oscar has (m1)
d(m2)
d = (m1m2)
d
and can send the new message m1m2 to a third party, signed with Alice's key,
and pretend it came from Alice. The usual way of dealing with such an attack
is to allow only a certain set of legitimate messages (mod N) to be accepted.
A padding scheme xes the set of allowed or legitimate messages modulo N
to be only those values between 0 and N which have an ane form a+wm for
xed, known a and w modulo N . As an example, let N = 91, w = 6 and a = 1.
Then m can be chosen from 0 to b91=6c = 15 producing legitimate messages 1,
7, 13, 19, 25, 31, 37, 43, 49, 55, 61, 67, 73, 79, 85.
Since w 1 exists modulo N with very high probability (recall that in general
N is a product of two very large primes), we can rewrite a + wm more simply
as P +m(mod N) where P  aw 1 is xed and m is bounded by the size of
P . Thus, a forgery is a value (P +m)d(mod N) where P is xed and m is a
false message injected by an attacker, but the form and signature d appear to
be legitimate.
De Jonge and Chaum [3] in Crypto'85 were the rst to show that the size of
P in bytes needs to be at least one third the size of N as otherwise, a forgery
could be easily constructed. In 1997, Girault and Misarsky [4] were able to show
that the scheme was still insecure if the size of P is less than half the size of N ,
again by directly constructing forgeries. Then in [2], Brier, Clavier, Coron and
Naccache extended this to two thirds. In 2002, some additional forgery con-
structions appeared in this last case by Lenstra and Shparlinski [6]. The next
case, where P is less than three quarters the size of N , remains to be solved, in
terms of a direct construction.
Some recent papers have again considered this problem. Joux, Naccache
and Thome [5] use number eld sieving techniques to improve the complexity of
nding forgeries in the general case. More precisely, they show that computing
r0th roots modulo N is easier than factoring N using current methods, given
access to an oracle outputting roots of the form x+ c, for xed c. Oracle meth-
ods are again employed in a related paper [1] which describes two new attacks
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on the now defunct PKCS #1 v1.5.
In section three we prove the general result that, no matter what the size
of P , a forgery is always possible within O(N) computations. This in itself is
often not enough to render a cryptographic scheme useless. If it is computa-
tionally infeasible to generate a forgery, then the scheme may still be usable. In
section four, we illustrate this by demonstrating explicitly how construction of
a forgery is equivalent to solving a dependent system of diophantine equations
for the case where P is less than three quarters the size of N .
The authors wish to thank David Naccache for directing us to the problem,
and the referees for their comments.
2 Forgeries
Rephrasing the ideas of Section 1, Oscar would attempt to gather a number of
legitimate messages signed by Alice with her private key d : (P +x1)
d, (P +y1)
d
etc. where P is xed and public, and can combine these as products or quotients
to obtain
sQ
i=1
(P + xi)
d
tQ
i=1
(P + yi)d
 (P +m)d(mod N)
for some new message m without knowing d. He will then claim that P + m
came from Alice. However, this is only possible if m is in the correct range.
The Girault, Misarsky result [3] indicates that the size of P must be at least
one half the size of N in bytes. In terms of comparative size of the numbers,
this translates into P >
p
N . Since P + m is a value less than N , we con-
clude that m <
p
N . The Brier, Clavier, Coron, Naccache result translates into
P > ( 3
p
N)2 and so m < 3
p
N .
In the next section, we show that for all r  2, forgeries exist with 1  m 
d rpNe. However, we do not actually construct them.
3 Forgeries Are Always Possible
As promised, we show in this section that, no matter what the size of the padding
P , a forgery always exists in a xed-pattern padding scheme. The proof is based
on the pigeon-hole principle: if all values we generate are distinct, then we have
too many.
THEOREM Let P be a xed padding for an RSA xed-padding signature
scheme with modulus N . Let r be any integer greater than or equal to two, sat-
3
isfying r   1 < d rpNe. Then there is a message m, 1  m  d rpNe, such that
the signature of P +m can be forged.
Proof. Consider the equation
P + x0 
sY
i=1
(P + xi) (mod N) (1)
where s  2; 1  xi  d r
p
Ne for all 0  i  s, and all xi, 1  i  s, are xed
and distinct. A value for x0 in the range [1; d r
p
Ne] provides a forgery, either
using P + x0 as the forged message, or, if x0 equals some xi, 1  i  s, using
a factor in the right-hand side as the forged message. (Note that (P + xi)
 1
exists with high probability as noted earlier; in fact, only p + q values are not
invertible, where N = pq.) Clearly, s  d rpNe.
The plan of attack in the proof is to demonstrate that as the xi range over
their interval, then either a number of values of
F 
sY
i=1
(P + xi)  P (mod N) (2)
lie in the range [1; d rpNe], giving us a forgery, or, we obtain a contradiction.
Consider two representations of the right-hand side of (2) which are equalY
xi 2 X  S
2  jXj
(P + xi)  P 
Y
yi 2 Y  S
2  jY j
(P + yi)  P (3)
where S = f1:2: : : : sg and whre some xi is not equal to any yi.
Equation (3) then results in a forgery as described in Section 2.
We may therefore assume that all values ofY
xi 2 X  S
2  jXj
(P + xi)  P (4)
are distinct for all subsets of S not empty and not singletons. There are
2s   (s+ 1) such values.
We now show that 2s   (s + 1) > N   d rpNe if we choose s such that
s = log2(N). This will generate a contradiction, since some value of (4) must
be in the range [1; d rpNe].
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If 2s   (s + 1) > N   d rpNe then certainly, 2s  N   d rpNe + 4 and
s  log2(N   d r
p
Ne + 4). Thus, if we choose d rpNe  s  log2(N), the strict
inequality above is sastised. 
COROLLARY The complexity of nding a forgery using the method of the
proof of the Theorem is O(N   d rpNe) = O(N).
Proof. since we calculate (at most) 2s (s+1) products, as shown in the proof
s is about log2(N   d r
p
Ne+ 4). Thus 2s is of order O(N   d rpNe) = O(N).
As r grows, the complexity approaches N rapidly which may explain why
resolving the 3=4 case has proved considerably more dicult than that for 1=2
and 2=3.
EXAMPLE For N = 1034273; r = 4; d 4p1034273e = 36, we have 223 =
8388608 and 224 = 167772164. So 2s > 1034237 + (s + 1) if s = 24. Thus
s = 24 suces to ensure a forgery in this case.
4 Constructing Forgeries
While knowing it is possible to construct forgeries is worthwhile in itself, if it is
too dicult, or takes too long, to actually construct a forgery, the scheme may
still be used with some sense of security. In this section, we reduce the problem
of forgery construction to that of solving a dependent system of diophantine
equations in the case where the size of P is less than three quarters the size of
N . However, in this case, we have no general method of solving the system and
leave this as an open problem.
The diophantine equations we are after are produced from the quotient equa-
tions in the previous section. A forgery results in an equality of two products
simply by cross-multiplying. The number of terms on each side can be equalized
simply by adding sucient terms of the form P + xi = 1.
The papers dealing with the cases one third, one half and two thirds derive
their forgeries from such equations. Here we illustrate the situation for the next
case, three quarters. We rewrite a message m as a sum or dierence x+ y etc.
CASE 3/4
Consider (P + x+ y)(P + z +w)(P + v+ s)  (P + x  y)(P + z  w)(P + v 
s) (mod N) which we want to solve for 0 < jx + yj, jx   yj, jz + wj, jz   wj,
jv + sj, jv   sj < N1=4. This implies 0 < jxj, jyj, jzj, jwj, jvj, jsj < N1=4.
Expanding and multiplying by 2 1 mod N (N is odd), we obtain
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P 2(y + w + s) + P (x(w + s) + z(y + s) + v(y + w))+
xzs+ xwv + yzv + yws  0 (mod N) (4)
Let P 2  Q, 0 < Q < N:
By the extended Euclidean algorithm (see reference [4]), there exist tQ and
rQ such that
tQQ  rQ (mod N); jtQj < N1=4; 0 < rQ < 2N3=4:
And there exist tP and rP such that
tPP  rP (mod N); jtP j < N1=2; 0 < rP < 2N1=2:
So tQQ+ tPP  rQ + rP (mod N).
Thus (4) becomes, for known rQ and rp
rQ + rP + x(zs+ wv) + y(zv + ws)  0 (mod N) (4)0
We want to obtain y, w, s, x, z and v such that
tQ = y + w + s; (5)
tP = x(w + s) + z(y + s) + v(y + w) (6)
and such that (4)' holds. Since rQ + rP is a known quantity, we can re-write
the equation (4)' with constraints as:
determine s, v, w, x, y and z such that
x(zs+ wv) + y(zv + ws)  A (mod N) (4)
tQ = y + w + s; (5)
tP = x(w + s) + z(y + s) + v(y + w) (6)
where A, tP and tQ are known quantities, A is less than N , 0 < jxj, jyj, jzj, jwj,
jvj, jsj < N1=4, jtQj < N1=4 and jtP j < N1=2.
Similar systems of equations can be developed for each value of r from the
preceding section, but clearly, as r increases, so does the complexity of the
equations. We do not know how to solve these equations but hope to inspire
these working in the eld of diophantine equations to tackle them.
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